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ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL SEA 
PIRACY:  HOW PROPERTY TRUMPED HUMAN RIGHTS, THE 
ENVIRONMENT AND THE SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OF STATES IN THE 
AREAS OF THE CREATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Leticia M. Diaz and Barry Hart Dubner* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One cannot pick up a newspaper or watch the news these days without seeing 
articles or stories about the “Somali pirates.”  In fact, piracy has taken an increas-
ing toll on international shipping in the key water link between the Mediterranean 
Sea and the Indian Ocean.  In 2008, a total of forty-nine vessels were hijacked 
worldwide.1  Forty-two of the forty-nine hijackings occurred off Somalia’s 1,900 
mile (3,000-kilometer) coast line, and pirates made an estimated $30 million in 
ransom for those forty-two vessels.2  Navies from all over the world have begun to 
show their presence in this area.  However, the problem has arisen with regard to 
whether or not the various countries involved have the prescriptive and enforce-
ment jurisdiction over these pirates.  In fact, Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that there were legal and military obstacles combat-
ing piracy.3  “One of the challenges that you will have in piracy, clearly, is, if you 
are intervening and you capture pirates, is there a path to prosecute them?”4  This 
statement by the Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff is rather surprising because 
the jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce punishment over pirates has long been 
settled.  If the comment by Admiral Mullen is merely requesting information about 
where to prosecute the pirates if they are captured, that is a valid query.  The pur-
pose of this article, therefore, is to review the evolution of the law of international 
sea piracy in order to assist people like Admiral Mike Mullen and the Danish Gov-
ernment, among others, in giving them authority for prosecuting pirates.  As this 
article develops, the reader is going to see how property rights have become so 
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 1.    ICC INTERNATIONAL MARITIME BUREAU, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS, ANNUAL 
REPORT: 1 JANUARY – 31 DECEMBER 2008 26 (2009) [hereinafter IMB ANNUAL REPORT 2008]. 
 2. Id.; Malkhadir M. Muhumed, Somali pirates make off with $3.2 million ransom, Associated Press, Feb. 
5, 2009, available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Somali+pirates+make+off+with+%243.2+million+ransom-
a01611787903. 
 3. Thom Shanker, U.S. Urges Merchant Ships to Try Steps to Foil Pirates, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2008, at 
A10. 
 4. Id. 
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important due to the value of the cargo and ships taken both off the coast of Soma-
lia and in the Gulf of Aden, that human rights, the environment and the sovereign 
right of at least one State, Somalia, has been trumped by such actions.  In other 
words, the reader will observe that property is far more important than human 
rights and the environment.  The question is whether certain U.N. Resolutions have 
given the various navies authority to attack targets on land as well as ones in inter-
nal waters or territorial seas.   
The aforementioned article, which set forth Admiral Mullen’s comment,  went 
on to say that as of that day, there had been 95 acts of piracy committed in the Gulf 
of Aden and the surrounding waters,39 captured vessels, and  330 sailors from 25 
nations who still remain hostage.5  If the Admiral’s remark was somewhat confus-
ing to those of us who thought we understood jurisdictional matters regarding sea 
piracy, it was compounded by the fact that around the middle of November, the 
Somali pirates captured a Saudi owned super tanker, VLCC (a very large crude 
carrier) Sirius Star, owned by Saudi Aramco’s Tanker Arm, Vela, with about two 
million barrels of crude oil aboard the ship.6  It was the largest ship ever hijacked.7  
It was hijacked off the Somali coast.8  It was hijacked several hundred miles off 
shore which was an anomaly because, for the most part, the pirate attacks occurred 
in coastal waters.9  The super tanker was a ship that measured 1,080 feet in length 
(which happens to be the length of an aircraft carrier).10  It had a 25-man crew, 
including Croatian, British, Filipino, Polish, Saudi and American citizens.11  Al-
though in most cases ships and crews are freed after payment of ransom money, the 
hijackings that have occurred could boost freight rates and insurance.12  Therefore, 
some shipping companies are choosing to divert their ships around the Cape of 
Good Hope rather than go through the Suez Canal; such a diversion could add as 
many as ten to twenty days to their journeys, as well as increasing fuel costs.13  In 
the end, everything shipped in that area would cost more for consumers. 
Against this background, we will first look at statistics concerning piratical in-
cidents that have occurred during the past year in order to see the impact that they 
are having on the world economy.  It is also important to review the total scope of 
piracy worldwide with regard to the number and type of incidents thereof, because 
Somalia is not the only place in the world where piracy occurs.  Thereafter, we will 
 ________________________  
 5. Id. 
 6. Robert F. Worth, Pirates Seize Saudi Tanker off Kenya; Ship Called the Largest Ever Hijacked, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 18, 2008, at A6. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id.; see also, Barbara Surk & Tarek el-Tablawy, Daring pirates pull off coup: Seizing giant oil tanker, 
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 18, 2008, at A15.  
 9. Surk & el-Tablawy, supra note 8, at A15. 
 10. Worth, supra note 6, at A6. 
 11. Id. 
 12. INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY, OIL MARKET REPORT FOR 12/11/2008, p. 40 [hereinafter, IEA 
REPORT], available at http://omrpublic.iea.org/omrarchive/11dec08full.pdf; Jeffrey Gettleman, Pirates in Skiffs 
Still Outmaneuvering Warships Off Somalia, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2008, International, at A6 [hereinafter Pirates 
in Skiffs]. 
 13. IEA REPORT , supra note 12, at 40. 
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analyze the history of prescribing and enforcing a jurisdiction regarding the inter-
national law of sea piracy.   
A. Background to “Somali” Piracy 
1. The Problems Concerning Piratical Acts 
Some of the important facts derived from the news in 2008 regarding the “So-
mali pirates” should be shown here; inter alia: the number of pirates; the type of 
vessels attacked; the amount of hijackings; the kidnapping of crews; the ransom 
demands; the hostages taken, have served to exacerbate the situation with regard to 
prescribing and enforcing jurisdiction.  For example, it was reported on September 
27th that pirates have more than 1,000 gunmen at their disposal.14  Mr. Mohamed, a 
Somali diplomat, said:  “This is not a Somali problem.  This is an international 
problem.  Shipping across this entire region is imperiled by this.”15  Apparently, the 
Somali pirates “tend to hide their captured ships in isolated coves, ferrying people 
and cargo back and forth in dingies which are not exactly built for transporting 
forty ton pieces of solid steel equipment.”16  On September 28th and 29th it was re-
ported that the Ukrainian vessel was taken toward Xarardheere and Hobyo which 
are isolated fishing villages that have thrived on organized crime and are frequently 
used as pirate hide-outs and places to keep seized ships.17  The pirates made it quite 
clear that they were not interested in the tanks aboard the Ukrainian vessel.18  They 
were interested in reward money or ransom.19  The Somali pirates freed the Ukrai-
nian ship that was carrying tanks and other heavy weapons on Thursday, February 
5, 2009 after receiving a $3.2 million ransom which was dropped by air into the 
water.20  The United States Navy watched the pirates get the money but did not act 
because the pirates were still holding 147 people from other crews that had been 
taken as hostages.21  
The piracy “industry” in Somalia started ten to fifteen years ago as a response 
to illegal fishing of tuna in Somalia waters by various States.22  These “fishermen” 
armed themselves and became piracy (vigilantes) by confronting illegal fishing 
boats and demanding that they pay a tax.23  Then the “fishermen” saw how easy it 
was to obtain ransoms and became greedy.24  Piracy in Somalia is a highly orga-
 ________________________  
 14. Jeffrey Gettleman, Long Scourge of Somali Seas, Pirates Provoke World Powers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
10, 2008, at A1, A9 [hereinafter Long Scourge of Somali Seas]. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. (referring to the kidnapping of a Ukrainian vessel with tanks and other military equipment aboard). 
 17. Jeffrey Gettleman, Pirates Seek $35 Million For Ship With Costly Cargo, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2008, 
International, at 11 [hereinafter Pirates Seek $35 Million]; Jeffrey Gettleman, Tensions Rise Over Ship Hijacked 
Off Somalia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2008, at A9 [hereinafter Tensions Rise]. 
 18. Jeffrey Gettleman, Pirates Tell Their Side: They Want Only Money, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2008, at A6, 
A10 [hereinafter, Pirates Tell Their Side]. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Muhumed, supra note 2. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Pirates Tell Their Side, supra note 18, at A10. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
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nized, ransom-driven business.25  As far as the arms-laden Ukrainian ship is con-
cerned, Somalia officials were quoted as saying that “‘a military operation has to 
be taken.’ . . .  ‘If the Islamists get the arms,’ he said, referring to Islamist insur-
gents currently waging war on Somalia’s weak government, ‘they will cause prob-
lems for all of Somalia.’”26   
Seventeen years ago, Somalia’s central government collapsed and clan war-
lords divided the country into fiefs, plunging the country into chaos which contin-
ues to the present.27  The fighting has intensified since December 2006 when 
Ethiopian troops invaded the country in order to rid Somalia of Islamic movements 
that controlled most of Somalia.28  The American military helped the Ethiopians 
hunt down the Islamic leaders because the Islamist leaders were harboring al Qaeda 
terrorists.29  As a result of the intensified conflict and a recent drought, more than 
three million Somalis – nearly half the population – need emergency food to sur-
vive.30  Most of this aid comes by ship, which poses a major problem because 
“Somalia’s 1,880-mile coastline is crawling with pirates.”31         
As far as the Ukrainian freighter is concerned, pirates asked for $20 million.32  
The freighter was hijacked 200 miles from the coastline on September 25th and was 
carrying 33 T-72 tanks, 150 grenade launchers, 6 antiaircraft guns, and heaps of 
ammunition – including some made from depleted uranium.33  The Kenyan gov-
ernment claimed Kenya was the final destination of the armament, but some be-
lieve the arms may have been heading for Sudan.34  The ship was owned by an 
Israeli; the Ukrainians operated it; the crew consisted of seventeen Ukrainian sai-
lors, two Russians, and one Latvian.35 
B. Somali Pirates and Their Hunting Grounds – The Nature and Extent of 
the Problem 
Hunting grounds for the pirates comprise more than a million square miles.36  
To be safe, merchant ships have to stay in a narrow corridor identified by U.S. Na-
val authorities.37  Of fifteen recent pirate attacks, ten took place outside these corri-
dors.38  Most ships do not have heavy security.39   
 ________________________  
 25. Id. at A6. 
 26. Tensions Rise, supra note 17, at A9. 
 27. Long Scourge of Somali Seas, supra note 14, at A9. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at A1. 
 32. Jeffrey Gettleman, Amid Talks With Pirates, A Question of Who Pays, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2008, at A8 
[hereinafter Talks With Pirates]. 
 33. Long Scourge of Somali Seas, supra note 14, at A9.; Pirates Seek $35 Million, supra note 17, at 11; 
Tensions Rise, supra note 17, at A9; Jeffrey Gettleman, Hijacked Arms Freighter Is Cornered by U.S. Navy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 30, 2008, at A14 [hereinafter, Hijacked Arms Freighter]. 
 34. Hijacked Arms Freighter, supra note 33, at A14. 
 35. Talks With Pirates, supra note 32, at A8. 
 36. Worth, supra note 6, at A6. 
 37. Id.; IMB ANNUAL REPORT 2008, supra note 1, at 23 (listing the co-ordinates of the corridor). 
 38. Worth, supra note 6, at A6. 
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The average ransom for a ship is now in the range of $500,000 to $2 million.40  
In 2008, these sums went up from tens of thousands of dollars to hundreds of thou-
sands, and even millions of dollars.41  The United Nations estimated the Somali 
pirates’ profits at $120 million in 2008.42  The question has been asked why bother 
paying at all?  Why not just give the pirates the vessels?  Apparently, ransoms are 
paid because they are low when compared to the values of the ships.43   
How do pirates get aboard such large ships?  Pirates use ropes and ladders to 
climb the hulls, which are generally about thirty feet from water to the deck.44  On 
large ships with small crews – like the Saudi supertanker, Sirius Star, which had 
only a 25-member crew on a ship 1,080 feet long – pirates can often board the ship 
unnoticed.45  Pirates also use rocket propelled grenade launchers that punch holes 
on the side of the ships.46  An example of such an attack was made against a Japa-
nese oil tanker in April, 2008.47  Oil can be spilled into the sea due to this type of 
attack, causing heavy environmental damage.48   
Apparently, pirates are now moving southward into the area of the Indian 
Ocean, thereby becoming more difficult and costly to patrol.49  Accidental deaths 
can occur due to over-anxious sailors.  For example, the Indian Navy sank a Thai 
boat that had allegedly been seized by pirates.50  “This vessel was similar in de-
scription to the ‘mother vessel’ mentioned in various piracy bulletins.  ‘Mother 
ships’ are defined as ocean going boats, often large fishing trawlers, that tow or 
carry speedboats.”51  Faster, more nimble speed boats are deployed to attack and 
hijack commercial vessels, which are then held for ransom.52  On November 29, 
2008, the Orlando Sentinel reported that when Somali pirates seized a chemical 
tanker, three security guards jumped into the sea and were rescued by a NATO 
helicopter gunship.53  There was a crew on board of twenty-five Indians and two 
Bangladeshis who were taken as hostage.54  It is important to note the fact that 
about twenty tankers sail through the international shipping lane daily.55 
  
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Pirates in Skiffs, supra note 12, at A6. 
 43. Worth, supra note 6, at A6. 
 44. Surk & el-Tablawy, supra note 8, at A15. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. The Sirius Star, which was hijacked by Somali pirates on November 15, 2008, was carrying 84 million 
gallons of oil.  John S. Burnett, Grand Theft Nautical, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2008, Op-Ed, at A33.  The Exxon 
Valdez, which caused extensive environmental damage when it ran aground and spilled much of its oil into the 
Gulf of Alaska in 1989, carried 53 million gallons of crude oil.  Id. 
 49. Surk & el-Tablawy, supra note 8, at A15. 
 50. Mark McDonald, Mistake Cited in Sinking of Boat by India, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2008, at A10. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Katharine Houreld, Pirates take over tanker – 3 guards jump ship, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 29, 2008, 
at A5. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
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The pirates seem to be getting bolder.  Twenty speedboats filled with pirates 
launched a simultaneous attack off the coast of Yemen.56  All ships used evasive 
maneuvers to prevent boarding during a four-hour attack.57  Russia’s UN Ambas-
sador Churkin said that the UN might pass a new resolution with aggressive rules 
of engagement.58 According to the New York Times, October 2, 2008, the growing 
price to free a hijacked ship was between $1 million and $2 million.59 As of De-
cember 10th, there were 102 ships attacked off of Somalia and in the Gulf region; 
forty hijackings; and, “piracy is now a real industry in Somalia.  Whole clans are 
living off it.”60  How can pirates in small boats stop a 30,000 ton ship?  These ships 
are usually equipped with a cannon-long-range acoustic devise (or LRAD) that can 
cost up to $125,000 – which shoots sound waves that can be debilitating at 100 
meters or 330 feet.61  However, pirates usually come at night in speedboats (too 
small and too fast to be picked up by radar.)62  Using grappling hooks over the rail-
ings and scampering up the sides, the whole process to board the ship takes about 
five minutes.63 
In November, 2008, two Chinese ships were hijacked – a fishing trawler and a 
cargo flying a Hong Kong flag and carrying wheat.64  “About 60% of China’s im-
ported oil comes from the Middle East, and much of that passes through the Gulf of 
Aden, along with huge shipments of raw materials from Africa.”65  “To help com-
bat the sharp rise of increasingly brazen pirate attacks in the [G]ulf, the European 
Union deployed its first-ever naval mission in December, 2008, a six-ship flotilla.  
The Union’s operation, code-name Atalanta, joined other navies already patrolling 
there, including those from the United States, Russia, and India.”66  The article 
went on to say that the U.N. Security Council passed a Resolution allowing hot 
pursuit and/or breach of Somalia’s 12-mile territorial sea and internal waters.67  
The Resolution seemed to indicate that they could launch a ground attack against 
the pirates on Somali soil.68  (More on that later.)  On December 17, 2008, it was 
also reported that pirates could be attacked on shore.69  However, the final wording 
of the Resolution narrowed the application of enforcement by requiring the express 
consent of Somalia’s government and saying that pirates should be pursued with an 
 ________________________  
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Jeffrey Gettleman, Somali Pirates, Haggling Over Arms-Laden Ship, Appear to Be Reducing Ransom, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2008, at A14. 
 60. Mark McDonald, Array of Strategies Are Tried To Turn Back Pirates at Sea, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 
2008, at A21. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Mark McDonald, China Seems Prepared to Join Antipirate Patrols, in Rare Move Beyond the Pacific, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2008, at A6 [hereinafter, China Seems Prepared to Join Antipirate Patrols]. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Neil MacFarquahar, U.N. Council Shows Support For U.S. Plan Against Piracy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 
2008, at A11. 
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appropriate level of intensity.70  (The security council resolution(s) will be dis-
cussed later.)  The U.N. decided not to send a force to Somalia.  According to 
CNN, by December 17, 2008, there were 20,000 oil tankers, freighters and mer-
chant vessels that normally passed along the crucial shipping route each year.71  It 
pointed out that the U.N. Resolution authorized hot pursuit and coastal attacks on 
land.72  However, the Resolution does not state anything regarding enforcing juris-
diction on land.73 
As stated earlier, about 60% of China’s imported oil is from the Middle East 
and most of that passes through the Gulf of Aden.74  The article on December 27, 
2008 indicated that 110 ships have been attacked in the Gulf in 2008 and 42 were 
hijacked.75  Fourteen ships were still being held for ransom as of that day.76  
Twelve hundred and sixty-five Chinese commercial vessels passed through the 
Gulf in 2008, seven of those were attacked.77  Pirates were still holding a Chinese 
fishing trawler and eighteen crew men as hostage.78  In response thereto, China sent 
two destroyers, equipped with guided missiles, a supply ship, special forces, and 
two helicopters into the region.79  By doing so, China made a strong showing of 
force as well as creating a naval presence in the area.  The pirates made more than 
$30 million in 2008.80  Keep in mind that the Somali coastline is 1,880 miles.81  As 
an aside, one third of the world’s merchant sailors are from the Philippines.82  More 
than 100 Filipinos have been held by Somali pirates.83  Nearly 300 sailors in all are 
being held.84  As a final touch to end a rather “long” year of Somali incidents, a 
Greek ship escaped pirates by using fire hoses on January 1, thus, bringing in the 
New Year of 2009.85  The incidents of Somali piracy have resulted in higher insur-
ance rates for shippers, higher fuel costs because of detours, new private security 
bills and million-dollar ransoms. 
One of the problems that will be discussed concerning jurisdiction is the atti-
tude of many Western diplomats who have stated that maritime law can be “as 
murky as the seas.”86  Several times during 2008, the Danish Navy captured men 
they suspected of being pirates only to dump them onshore after the Danish gov-
 ________________________  
 70. Id. 
 71. About 20 Chinese rescued from pirate attack, CNN.COM, Dec. 17, 2008, 
http://www.cnn.com/2008/world/africa/12/17/somaliapiracy. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. China Seems Prepared to Join Antipirate Patrols, supra note 64, at A6.; Mark McDonald, Chinese 
Warships Sail, Loaded for Pirates, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2008, at A6 [hereinafter Chinese Warships Sail]. 
 75. Chinese Warships Sail, supra note 75, at A6. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. China will help run off pirates, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 27, 2008, at A3. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Carlos H. Conde, Despite Wave of Piracy, Filipinos Crave Work as Sailors, N.Y. TIMES, International, 
Dec. 21, 2008, at A24. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Greek ship’s crew foils pirates, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 3, 2009, at A3. 
 86. Pirates in Skiffs, supra note 6, at A6. 
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ernment decided that they did not have jurisdiction.87  The same article reported 
that it was unclear as to where pirates should be prosecuted.88  In fact, at a recent 
antipiracy conference, British officials outlined a plan to try to capture pirates and 
prosecute them in Kenyan courts.89  This plan was subsequently adopted.90 
C. On the Importance of Maritime Shipping and the Problems with 
“Choke Points” 
In order to further our understanding of jurisdictional problems, it is best to 
give statistics on maritime shipping, in general, especially the shipment of oil.  
Contained in the United Nations General Assembly Report of the Secretary-
General on the Oceans and the Law of the Sea is an excellent summary:  
According to a recent UNCTAD publication, world seaborne trade 
(goods loaded) increased in 2006, reaching 7.4 billion tons.  The 
world merchant fleet expanded to 1.04 billion deadweight tons 
(dwt) at the beginning of 2007, representing an 8.6-per cent in-
crease over 2006, of which the highest growth was recorded for 
containerships.  Total tonnage on order reached 6,908 vessels with 
a total tonnage of 302.7 million dwt.  The estimated average age of 
the world fleet dropped marginally to 12 years in 2006.  The oldest 
vessel type remains the general cargo vessel representing 56.8 per 
cent of all vessels more than 19 years old.  It has an average age of 
17.4 years.  As regards fleet ownership, developing countries con-
trolled about 31.2 per cent of the world dwt, developed countries 
about 65.9 per cent and economies in transition the remaining 2.9 
per cent at the beginning of 2007.  Between January 2006 and 
2007, the foreign-flagged share for the first time since 1989 
slightly decreased from 66.5 per cent to 66.3 per cent of the world 
total.  The 10 major open and international registries account for 
53.7 per cent of the world fleet.  Of the remaining tonnage, 27.7 
per cent is registered in developing countries, 18.9 per cent is reg-
istered in developed countries and 1.3 per cent in countries in tran-
sition.91 
In order to better understand the economics regarding oil shipments, one must 
keep in mind that there are “choke points,” narrow channels along widely used 
global sea routes.92  Due to the high volume of oil traded through their narrow 
 ________________________  
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at A14. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Lolita Baldor, Patrols keeping pirates at bay, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Mar. 6, 2009, at A11. 
 91. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Oceans and the law of the sea, ¶ 51, deli-
vered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/63/63/Add.1 (Aug. 29, 2008). 
 92. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEFS: WORLD OIL TRANSIT CHOKEPOINTS (2008), 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/Full.html. 
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straits, they are critical to supplying global energy and security.93  Two of the 
world’s most strategic “choke points” are the Strait of Hormuz leading out of the 
Persian Gulf and the Strait of Malacca linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans.94  
Pertinent to our discussion is the Bab el-Mandab which connects the Arabian Sea 
with the Red Sea.95  In 2007, total world oil production amounted to approximately 
eighty-five million barrels per day and around one-half, or over forty-three million 
barrels per day of oil, were moved by tankers on fixed maritime routes.96  The in-
ternational energy market is dependent upon reliable transport.  So if a “choke 
point” is blocked, even temporarily, it can lead to increased energy cost.97  In addi-
tion, as it will be seen here, “choke points”  leave oil tankers vulnerable to theft 
from pirates, terrorist attacks and political unrest in the form of wars or hostilities, 
as well as shipping accidents, which can lead to disastrous oil spills and injure the 
environment.98 
The two “choke points” that are important for the purpose of this article are the 
Suez Canal/Sumed pipeline which, at the narrowest point, is only 1,000 feet; and, 
Bab el-Mandab, which is eighteen miles wide, at its narrowest point.99  If either of 
these two “choke points” were shut off, it would be necessary to re-route around 
the southern tip of Africa (the Cape of Good Hope) which would mean an addi-
tional 6,000 miles in both cases.100  In the case of Bab el-Mandab, northbound traf-
fic can use the East-West oil pipeline through Saudi Arabia.101  There is no such 
outlet for the Suez Canal “choke point.”102 
Having given an overview of the problems created by the Somali pirates and 
the extent to which the nations of the world are affected by these acts, we now turn 
to the jurisdictional evolution of international sea piracy.  In order to understand 
the jurisdictional issues, it is first essential to be aware of certain international law 
of the sea concepts. 
II. JURISDICTIONAL ANALYSIS OF LAW OF THE SEA CONCEPTS 
The crime of “piracy” means different things to different people.  As an intro-
ductory statement, it could be said that “piracy” is an act of violence, depredation 
or detention committed for private ends, delegated to the high seas and committed 
by one private ship against another ship.103  The 1982 United Nations Convention 
 ________________________  
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., COUNTRY ANALYSIS BRIEFS: WORLD OIL TRANSIT CHOKEPOINTS (2008), 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/Full.html. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Barry Hart Dubner, Human Rights and Environmental Disaster – Two Problems that Defy the 
“Norms” of the International Law of Sea Piracy, 23 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 1, 9-10 (1997); see also United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Art. 101, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, S. Treaty Doc. No. 39, 
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on the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”) took effect in November, 1994, and 159 na-
tions have ratified it as of July 20, 2009.104  The UNCLOS’s draft established a 
framework within which to codify existing customary law, in part, as well as to 
create new principles for civilized nations.105  During the course of this article, 
there are law of the sea terms that need to be understood by the reader.  The follow-
ing is a schematic diagram which has been drawn for the purposes of introductory 
analysis: 
103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) [hereinafter 1982 Convention], available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf. 
 104. Oceans and Law of the Sea, Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Chronological lists of 
ratifications of, accessions and successions to the Convention and the related Agreements as at [sic] 20 July 2009, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm#The United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea. 
 105. Dubner, supra note 103, at 1 (citing, generally, Bernard H. Oxman, United States Interests in the Law 
of the Sea Convention, 88 Am. J. Int’l L. 167 (1994)). 
10
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A. Jurisdiction Concepts Regarding Laws of Sea 
The coastal State exercises the utmost jurisdiction over its land territory.106  
Every coastal State has a baseline,107 be it straight or mean average water line, 
which is used to measure the diminishing jurisdiction of the coastal state as one 
moves seaward.108  The coastal State exercises exclusive jurisdiction over its ports 
and harbors (with possible access to visiting ships).109  As one moves seaward from 
the baseline, the State exercises almost total jurisdiction over its territorial sea,110 
except for the doctrine of innocent passage,111 which is measured twelve miles 
 ________________________  
 106. Id. at 11. 
 107. Id.  The 1982 Convention defines “baseline” as follows: “Except where otherwise provided in this 
Convention, the normal baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the 
coast as marked on large-scale charts officially recognized by the coastal state.”  1982 Convention, supra note 
103, at art. 5 
 108. Dubner, supra note 103, at 11. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id.  Articles 3 and 4 of the 1982 Convention define the “territorial sea.”  “Every State has the right to 
establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical miles, measured from baselines 
determined in accordance with this Convention.”  1982 Convention, supra note 103, at art. 3.  “The outer limit of 
the territorial sea is the line every point of which is at a distance from the nearest point of the baseline equal to the 
breadth of the territorial sea.”  Id. at art. 4. 
 111. Dubner, supra note 103, at 11.  “Innocent passage” is defined by the 1982 Convention as follows: 
1. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of 
the coastal State.  Such passage shall take place in conformity with this Convention and 
with other rules of international law. 
2. Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered to be prejudicial to the peace, good order or 
security of the coastal State if in the territorial sea it engages in any of the following activi-
ties: 
a. any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of the coastal State, or in any other manner in violation of the principles of interna-
tional law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations; 
b. any exercise or practice with weapons of any kind; 
c. any act aimed at collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or security of the 
coastal State; 
d. any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the defence or security of the coastal State; 
e. the launching, landing or taking on board of any aircraft; 
f. the launching, landing or taking on board of any military device; 
g. the loading or unloading of any commodity, currency or person contrary to the customs, 
fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the coastal State; 
h. any act of willful and serious pollution contrary to this Convention; 
i. any fishing activities; 
j. the carrying out of research or survey activities; 
k. any act aimed at interfering with any systems of communication or any other facilities or 
installations of the coastal State; 
l. any other activity not having a direct bearing on passage. 
1982 Convention, supra note 103, at art. 19. 
11
and : International Sea Piracy
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2009
186 Barry Law Review Vol. 13 
 
seaward from its baseline.112  The State’s jurisdiction diminishes further when the 
continuous zone,113 which extends twelve miles beyond the territorial waters, 
reaches the high seas.114  The continuous zone gives a limited area to jurisdiction of 
the coastal State (e.g., navigation, sanitation, customs, fiscal) and is actually part of 
the high seas.115  The high seas are open to all nations and therefore the coastal 
State is not allowed to exercise its jurisdiction in this area (with limited exceptions, 
e.g., the exclusive economic zone).116 
 ________________________  
 112. Dubner, supra note 103, at 11. 
 113. Id.  “Contiguous zone” is defined by the 1982 Convention as follows: 
1. In a zone contiguous to its territorial sea, described as the contiguous zone, the coastal 
State may exercise the control necessary to: 
a. Prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regu-
lations within its territory or territorial sea; 
b. Punish infringement of the above laws and regulations committed within its territo-
ry or territorial sea; 
2. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond 24 nautical miles from the baselines from 
which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured. 
1982 Convention, supra note 103, at art. 33. 
 114. Dubner, supra note 103, at 11. 
 115. Dubner, supra note 103, at 11-12.  “Exclusive economic zone” is defined as follows:  “The exclusive 
economic zone is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea, subject to the specific legal regime established 
in this Part, under which the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State and the rights and freedoms of other States 
are governed by the relevant provisions of this Convention.”  1982 Convention, supra note 103, at art. 55.  Article 
56 of the 1982 Convention governs the rights, jurisdiction and duties of the coastal State in the exclusive economic 
zone: 
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has: 
a. sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and man-
aging the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to 
the sea-bed and of the sea-bed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for 
the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of ener-
gy from the water, currents and winds; 
b. jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of this Convention with re-
gard to: 
i. The establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and structures; 
ii. Marine scientific research; 
iii. The protection and preservation of the marine environment; 
c. other rights and duties provided for in this Convention. 
2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Convention in the exclusive 
economic zone, the coastal State shall have due rights and duties of other States and shall 
act in a manner compatible with the provisions of this Convention. 
3. The rights set out in this article with respect to the sea-bed and subsoil shall be exercised 
in accordance with Part VI. 
 
Id. at art. 56.  Finally, the 1982 Convention defines the breadth of the exclusive economic zone.  “The exclusive 
economic zone shall not extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the terri-
torial sea is measured.”  Id. at art. 57. 
 116. Dubner, supra note 103, at 12. 
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Historically, the high seas have traditionally been open to all nations for the 
purpose of preserving international shipping and commerce.117  However, this 
“freedom of the high seas” did not always exist.  In 1494, for example, the Pope, 
believing incorrectly at that time that Columbus had found the western sea route to 
Asia, divided the world between the two contending maritime nations by drawing a 
line through the middle of the Atlantic Ocean.118  “His ruling, agreed to in the trea-
ty of Tordesillas, assigned all lands 370 leagues (about 1,000 miles of the 75 miles) 
west of the Cape Verde Islands to Spain, and all land to the east, to Portugal.”119  
The freedom of the seas doctrine was first espoused by the writings of Grotius in 
the early 1600s.120  He believed that the ocean was too vast and too rich in re-
sources for any one nation to have control over its entire length and width.121  Since 
that time, the allowing of free maritime commerce and transport in international 
straits has been one of the hallmarks of the international community.122  Interna-
tional straits are preserved for international commerce and are open to all na-
tions.123  At the heart of all major maritime conventions and concerns is the concept 
that international commerce should not be interrupted by maritime violence (e.g., 
 ________________________  
 117. Id. 
 118. EDWARD KRITZLER, JEWISH PIRATES OF THE CARIBBEAN: HOW A GENERATION OF SWASHBUCKLING 
JEWS CARVED OUT AN EMPIRE IN THE NEW WORLD IN THEIR QUEST FOR TREASURE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM – AND 
REVENGE 30 (2008). 
 119. Id. 
 120. HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS (James Scott Brown ed., Ralph van Deman Magoffin 
trans., Oxford University Press 1916) (1608). 
 121. Id. at 8. 
 122. The 1982 Convention governs the legal status of waters forming straits used for international purposes:  
1. The regime of passage through straits used for international navigation established in this 
Part shall not in other respects affect the legal status of the waters forming such straits or in 
the exercise by the States bordering the straits of their sovereignty or jurisdiction over such 
waters and their air space, bed and subsoil. 
2. The sovereignty or jurisdiction of the States bordering the straits is exercised subject to 
this Part and to other rules of international law. 
1982 Convention, supra note 103, at art. 34.  Articles 37 and 38 of the 1982 Convention apply to transit passage 
for international purposes.  Article 37 limits transit passage to “straits which are used for international navigation 
between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the high seas or an exclusive 
economic zone.”  Id. at art. 37.  Article 38 then defines the right of transit passage as follows: 
1. In straits referred to in article 37, all ships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage, 
which shall not be impeded; except that, if the strait is formed by an island of a State border-
ing the strait and its mainland, transit passage shall not apply if there exists seaward of the 
island a route through the high seas or through an exclusive economic zone of similar con-
venience with respect to navigational and hydrographical characteristics. 
2. Transit passage means the exercise in accordance with this Part of the freedom of naviga-
tion and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the strait 
between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part of the 
high seas or an exclusive economic zone.  However, the requirement of continuous and ex-
peditious transit does not preclude passage through the strait for the purpose of entering, 
leaving or returning from a State bordering the strait, subject to the conditions of entry to 
that State. 
 
Id. at art. 38. 
 123. Dubner, supra note 103, at 12-13. 
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piracy and terrorism).  In other words, commerce must be able to flow freely, unin-
hibited, without danger to life and limb, and without the fear of shipping causing 
widespread environmental contamination. 
In order to be cognizant of the political dilemmas that certain countries such as 
Denmark and the United States (recall Admiral Mullen’s comments) believe they 
are confronted with, it is necessary to examine the historical background of mari-
time violence in order to have a sufficient understanding of the jurisdictional prob-
lems.  The authors will start by defining piracy under treaty law. 
III. DEFINITION OF PIRACY, TERRORISM, AND MARITIME VIOLENCE 
A. Definitions 
“Piracy” as defined in both the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas and  
UNCLOS were the same crime committed on high seas, as follows: 
Article 101 Definition of piracy 
Piracy consists of any of the following acts: 
(a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depreda-
tion, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a 
private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: 
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against per-
sons or property on board such ship or aircraft; 
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside 
the jurisdiction of any State; 
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or 
of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate-ship or 
aircraft; 
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act de-
scribed in subparagraph (a) or (b). 
Article 102 Piracy by warship, government ship or government 
aircraft whose crew has mutinied 
The acts of piracy, as defined in Article 101, committed by a war-
ship, government ship or government aircraft whose crew has mu-
tinied and taken control of the ship or aircraft are assimilated to 
acts committed by a private ship or aircraft. 
Article 103 definition of a pirate ship or aircraft 
14
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A ship or aircraft is considered a pirate ship or aircraft if it is in-
tended by the persons in dominant control to be used for the pur-
pose of committing one of the acts referred to in article 101.  The 
same applies if the ship or aircraft has been used to commit any 
such act, so long as it remains under the control of the person 
guilty of that act. 
Article 104 Retention or loss of the nationality of a pirate ship or 
aircraft 
A ship or aircraft may retain its nationality although it has become 
a pirate ship or aircraft.  The retention or loss of nationality is de-
termined by the law of the State from which such nationality was 
derived. 
Article 105 Seizure of a pirate ship or aircraft 
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of 
any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship 
or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and ar-
rest the persons and seize the property on board.  The courts of the 
State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties 
to be imposed, and may also determine the action to be taken with 
regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of 
third parties acting in good faith. 
Article 106 Liability for seizure without adequate grounds 
Where seizure of a ship or aircraft on suspicion of piracy has been 
effected without adequate grounds, the State making the seizure 
shall be liable to the State the nationality of which is possessed by 
the ship or aircraft for any loss or damage caused by the seizure.124 
Prior thereto, the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas defined “piracy” 
as follows: 
Article 15 
Piracy consists of any of the following acts: 
 ________________________  
 124. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Art. 101-06, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, S. 
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(1) Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of depreda-
tion, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a 
private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: 
(a) On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against 
persons or property on board such ship or aircraft; 
(b) Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside 
the jurisdiction of any State; 
(2) Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or 
of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or 
aircraft. 
(3) Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act de-
scribed in sub-paragraph 1 or sub-paragraph 2 of this article. 
Article 16 
The acts of piracy, as defined in article 15, committed by a war-
ship, government ship or government aircraft whose crew has mu-
tinied and taken control of the ship or aircraft are assimilated to 
acts committed by a private ship. 
Article 17 
A ship or aircraft is considered a pirate ship or aircraft if it is in-
tended by the persons in dominant control to be used for the pur-
pose of committing one of the acts referred to in article 15.  The 
same applies if the ship or aircraft has been used to commit any 
such act, so long as it remains under the control of the persons 
guilty of that act. 
Article 18 
A ship or aircraft may retain its nationality although it has become 
a pirate ship or aircraft.  The retention or loss of nationality is de-
termined by the law of the State from which such nationality was 
derived. 
Article 19 
On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of 
any State, every State may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship 
taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and arrest the per-
sons and seize the property on board.  The courts of the State 
16
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which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be 
imposed, and may also determine the action to be taken with re-
gard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of third 
parties acting in good faith.125 
There was no change in the conventional definitions of “pirates” from 1958 
through 1982.  Before explaining why there was no change and why the crime of 
piracy took place on high seas rather than in territorial waters, it is first necessary 
to look at another definition. 
The ICC International Maritime Bureau (IMB) is a specialized division of the 
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC).126  The IMB is a non-profit organiza-
tion which was established in 1981 to gather material and act as a focal point in the 
fight against all types of maritime crime and malpractice.127  Their definition of 
piracy is: “An act of boarding or attempting to board any ship with the apparent 
intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the apparent intent or capability 
to use force in the furtherance of that act.”128  This definition thus covers actual or 
attempted attacks whether the ship is berthed, at anchor, or at sea.129  Petty thefts 
are excluded unless the thieves are armed.130 
The above definition has been adopted by the IMB as the majority of attacks 
against ships take place within the jurisdictions of States and piracy as defined un-
der UNCLOS does not address this aspect.131 
The IMB noted that the International Maritime Organization (IMO) at its 74th 
meeting of MSC addressed this matter in the draft Code of Practice for the Investi-
gation of Crimes of Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships (MSC/Circ./984) 
article (2.2) (“The Code of Practice”).132 
The Code of Practice defines “Piracy” and “Armed Robbery against Ships” as 
follows: 
Piracy means unlawful acts as defined in article 101 of the 1982 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS): 
ARTICLE 101 
Definition of Piracy consists of any of the following acts: 
a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depreda-
tion, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a 
private ship or a private aircraft, and directed 
 ________________________  
 125. Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 2958, 13 U.S.T. 2312 (1962), 450 U.N.T.S. 82. 
 126. IMB ANNUAL REPORT 2008, supra note 1, at 2. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 3. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. IMB ANNUAL REPORT 2008, supra note 1, at 2. 
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(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against  per-
sons or property on board such ship or aircraft; 
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside 
 the jurisdiction of any State; 
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or 
 of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or 
aircraft; 
(c)  any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act  de-
scribed in subparagraph (a) or (b). 
“Armed Robbery against Ships means any unlawful act of violence 
or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, other than 
an act of “piracy,” directed against a ship or against persons or 
property on board such ship, within a State’s jurisdiction over such 
offences”133 
The above definitions now cover actual or attempted attacks whether the ship 
is berthed, at anchor, or at sea.134 
The reader will know right away that IMB’s definition is given “for statistical 
purposes” and defines Piracy and Armed Robbery in such a way that the definition 
covers actual or attempted attacks in any water, be it internal, territorial or high 
seas.135  Again, this is only for statistical purposes.  This is not a treaty signed onto 
by a consensus of the international community.  However, the statistics are very 
important to any discussion of maritime violence and are so noted. 
B. The Harvard Draft 
In order to understand why certain states are having difficulty understanding 
jurisdictional concepts concerning the crime of piracy, it is necessary to look back 
and see why the articles at the 1958 Convention were originally drafted.  Both the 
1958 and 1982 definitions of piracy (again, both are identical) are based on the 
Harvard Research Draft136  (“Harvard Draft”), which was prepared in 1932 for the 
purposes of “expediency.”137  The study itself was extremely comprehensive and 
has been used and cited in different texts.  In 1932, the drafters of the study were 
presented with a main question:  “What initial significance does piracy have in the 
 ________________________  
 133. Id. (quoting proposed changes to Int’l Mar. Org., Code of Practice for the Investigation of Crimes of 
Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, Res. A.922(22) (Nov. 2001)). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Harvard Research in International Law, Draft Convention on Piracy, with Comment, 26 AM. J. INT’L L. 
SUPP. 739 (1932) [hereinafter “Harvard Draft”]. 
 137. Dubner, supra note 103, at 11-12. 
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law of nations?”138  In order to find the intents of the drafters, we have selected a 
few excerpts from the Harvard Draft (a) to demonstrate the thinking of its drafters; 
and (b) to show their diverse opinions about what the contents of a convention 
should contain and why.  You will observe that many of their comments, and those 
of the commentaries quoted by them, are applicable to the situation today in Soma-
lia and other areas of the world. 
Why was the definition of piracy limited to the high seas?  Because the crime 
of piracy interfered with international shipping on the high seas.139  It was thought 
that if the piracy occurred in territorial or internal waters of the coastal State, the 
coastal State could (and would want to) resolve the situation by prescribing and 
enforcing its own municipal legislation on sea piracy.140  There was a disagreement 
over whether piracy was “an international crime.”141  The question at that time was 
“how would we treat the problem of piracy today in the light of the possibility of 
an international agreement for suppression?”142  At the time, there was a “modern 
orthodox view” that the law of nations is a law between States only, and limits their 
respect of jurisdictions.143  Since there was no “super-government and no interna-
tional tribunal to administer international civil or criminal justice against private 
persons,” and since there was “no provision in the laws of many states for punish-
ing foreigners which political offence was committed outside the state’s ordinary 
jurisdiction, it cannot truly be said that piracy is a crime or an offence by the law of 
nations, in a sense which a strict technical interpretation will give those terms.”144  
Proceeding with the discussion regarding any “norms” regarding law of interna-
tional sea piracy, it is necessary to first set forth statistics regarding this crime so 
that the readers can understand the true nature of the acts of piracy, where they 
occur and what is being done by other States to handle the situation. 
The IMB reported that there were 293 incidents of piracy during the year 
2008.145  This is more than an 11% increase on 2007, which is attributed to the un-
precedented number of attacks in the Gulf of Aden.146  The number of attacks has 
increased from the years 2006 and 2007 where there were a total of 239 and 263 
incidents reported respectively.147 
Not only did 2008 see an unprecedented number of attacks in the Gulf of Aden, 
it also saw the largest tanker ever hijacked, and successful attacks carried out at 
greater distances from land, along the east coast of Africa, than ever before.148  
Every attack off Somalia is aimed at hijacking a vessel; hence every attempted 
 ________________________  
 138. Id. at 16; Harvard Draft, supra note 136, at 749. 
 139. See generally, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Art. 101-06, opened for signature 
Dec. 10, 1982, S. Treaty Doc. No. 39, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), available at 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf. 
 140. Dubner, supra note 103, at 17. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Harvard Draft, supra note 136, at 753; Dubner, supra note 103, at 17. 
 143. Harvard Draft, supra note 136, at 760; Dubner, supra note 103, at 17. 
 144. Harvard Draft, supra note 136, at 756; Dubner, supra note 103, at 17. 
 145. IMB ANNUAL REPORT 2008, supra note 1, at 26. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
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attack is a failed hijacking rather than a simple act of robbery.149  All types of ves-
sels, with varying freeboards and speeds have been targeted and attacked.150  Look-
ing at the number worldwide in 2008, there were a total of forty-nine vessels hi-
jacked, 889 crew taken hostage and forty-six vessels reported being fired upon.151  
These are the highest numbers ever recorded by the Piracy Reporting Center.152  
Thirty-two crew members were injured: eleven killed and twenty-one missing, 
presumed dead.153  The nature of the attacks indicates that the pirates are better 
armed and prepared to assault and injure the usually unarmed crew.154  The total 
incidents in which guns have been used are 139, up from seventy-two in 2007.155  
Of the 293 worldwide incidents, 111 occurred off the east coast of Somalia or in 
the Gulf of Aden, an increase of nearly 200% over 2007.156   A total of forty-two 
vessels were hijacked by Somali pirates and 815 crew taken hostage.157  As of De-
cember 31, 2008, Somali pirates were holding thirteen vessels for ransom and 242 
hostage.158  The attacks picked up in September with nineteen attacks.159  In Octo-
ber and November there were fifteen and sixteen attacks respectively.160  During 
the first six months of 2009, worldwide piracy attacks numbered 240, more than 
double the 114 attacks for the same period in 2008.161  The rise in numbers is due 
almost entirely to increased Somali pirate activity off the Gulf of Aden and east 
coast of Somalia, which accounted for 130 of the 240 attacks.162 
One of the trends that the IMB also points out is the increased ability of Somali 
pirates to go out further to sea than before.163  This range, coupled with the inability 
of the Somali government to respond, encourage the pirates further.164  Currently, 
the reward to risk ratio for the Somali pirates is so large that only robust measures 
by international governments and navies will enable the safety and security of this 
major trade route to be restored.165  According to the IMB, Nigeria has the second 
highest number of serious attacks and is viewed as another high-risk area.166  The 
main difference between East and West African piracy is that almost all the inci-
dents in Nigeria are conducted within their territorial waters whereas most of the 
incidents along the East coast of Africa and the Gulf of Aden occur on the high 
 ________________________  
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. IMB ANNUAL REPORT 2008, supra note 1, at 26. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. ICC Commercial Crime Services, Piracy doubles in first six months of 2009, July 15, 2009, 
http://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=362:piracy-doubles-in-first-six-months-
of-2009&catid=60:news&Itemid=51. 
 162. Id. 
 163. IMB ANNUAL REPORT 2008, supra note 1, at 26. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
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seas.167  Somalia’s attacks are completely financially motivated, while Nigeria’s 
attacks are at least partly political.168  There have been forty confirmed incidents in 
Nigeria reported via the masters, owners and other risk intelligence gathering or-
ganizations.169  There are also approximately 100 unconfirmed incidents.170  Of the 
forty confirmed attacks, twenty-seven vessels have been boarded and five hi-
jacked.171  Nigeria has the highest number of crew being kidnapped (thirty-nine).172  
Many of the incidents go unreported as owners do not like to see their insurance 
rates go any higher than they are.173  The attacks in the Niger delta and the kidnap-
pings are targeted against the oil industry and reportedly for political change.174  Of 
course, from the shipping industry’s point of view, these attacks are criminal; se-
venteen of the incidents were against tankers, seven on supply ships and the re-
maining on bulk carriers, general cargo ships and container ships.175  The incidents 
in Nigeria are often quite violent and the crews are frequently injured and kid-
napped.176  Even ships provided with escort protection and armed security guards 
are still prey to the dedicated pirates.177  On the other hand, there are areas where 
there have been declines in these incidents of piracy.178  Indonesia is an example.  
Indonesia reported only twenty-eight, mostly opportunistic, attacks in 2008, down 
from a 2003 high of 121.179  The Malacca Strait has seen a further reduction in 
number of incidents reported with only two reported in 2008 as compared to seven 
in 2007.180  Incidents in the Singapore Strait are, however, up from three in 2007 to 
six in 2008.181  Malaysia has also seen a slight increase in the number of incidents 
with three vessels being hijacked and seven boarded as compared to nine boarded 
in 2007.182  The reduction on acts of piracy in the Indonesia, Strait of Malacca, 
areas is due to regional ship controls, increased vigilance and patrolling by the lit-
toral States and the precautionary measures taken on boarded ships.183  We can 
only assume that with the world economy being in the State that it is at the time of 
the writing of this article, there is a strong possibility of various acts of piracy in-
creasing. The number of attacks, and the value of the property involved, has 
brought a sense of outrage from the ship owners with a degree of response from the 
States affected thereby. 
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 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Id. 
 171. IMB ANNUAL REPORT 2008, supra note 1, at 26. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. IMB ANNUAL REPORT 2008, supra note 1, at 26. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. at 27. 
21
and : International Sea Piracy
Published by Digital Commons @ Barry Law, 2009
196 Barry Law Review Vol. 13 
 
C. The Outrage of the Ship Owners over Property Losses 
As the reader has observed, there has been an enormous increase (“unprece-
dented”) in the number of piracy attacks in Somalia/Gulf of Aden.  One of the sur-
prising events that have occurred in connection with the attacks by the Somali pi-
rates is that the violence attached to these attacks is unprecedented; the number of 
crew men hijacked; and, the amount of ransom demanded by the pirates is totally 
unprecedented in history.184  Also, all one need do is look at the size of the vessels 
that the pirates have attacked and one will see size does not matter in this situation.  
As stated previously in this article, there was a Saudi VLCC oil tanker hijacked and 
held for ransom as well as a bulk carrier weighing 74,000 tons, the largest bulk 
carrier ever hijacked.185  The main problem, however is that according to the IMB, 
navies are facing restrictions when dealing with the pirates.186  It is apparently un-
clear how a naval vessel should proceed if it intervenes and takes pirate prisoners, 
rather than killing them.187  According to the IMB, there have been very few flag 
states and only one neighboring country in the region, which has accepted prison-
ers for investigation and prosecution.  Naval vessels will understandably hesitate to 
intervene once hijackers have taken over a vessel and are holding crew hostage.  
Concern of the safety of the hostages may preclude on the intervention except in 
exceptional circumstances.188   
The naval units of various governments have been deployed in this area recent-
ly.189  They could certainly deploy in the high seas areas without any Resolution by 
the Security Council and without the approval of the government of Somalia.  
Mother vessels could be attacked if found and suspected pirates could have their 
weapons confiscated and their movements closely tracked as a deterrent.  The in-
ternational shipping industry points out that pirates are now attacking ships on a 
daily basis with machine guns and rocket propelled grenades and have over 200 to 
300 seafarers hostage.190  They are operating with impunity while governments 
stand idly by.191  They point out that if civil aircrafts were being hijacked on a daily 
basis the response of governments would be very different.192  They also state that 
ships, which are the life blood of the global community, are seemingly “out of 
sight” and therefore “out of mind.”193  It shows an indifference to the lives of the 
merchant seafarers as well as an indifference to the consequences for society at 
large, which is unacceptable.  The shipping industry is also shocked that the 
world’s leading nations, with the naval resources at their disposal, are unable to 
 ________________________  
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maintain the security of one of the world’s most strategically important seaways, 
like the one from Europe to Asia via the Red Sea/Suez Canal.194  The shipping in-
dustry has spent billions of dollars since 9/11 to comply with stringent new security 
requirements agreed by the international community in order to address concerns 
about terrorism.195  Yet, when merchant ships – which carry 90% of the world trade 
and keep the world economy moving – are subject to attack by pirates, the response 
of many governments is that it is not their problem and the shipping companies 
should hire mercenaries.196  The arming of merchant ships will almost certainly put 
the lives of the ships’ crew in even greater danger and is likely to escalate the level 
of violence employed by the pirates.197  It would also be illegal under the national 
law of many ships’ flag states and many other countries with whom they are trad-
ing.198  Thus, the shipping industry requested that the various nations send in their 
navies and protect merchant vessels.199  The navies must try to bring the pirates to 
justice in a court of law.  The pirates should not be allowed to resume their piratical 
activities because of the international community’s unwillingness to take the neces-
sary action.  If merchant vessels are forced to redirect their ships via the Cape of 
Good Hope, this would add several weeks to the duration of many ships’ voyages 
and would have severe consequences for international trade, the maintenance of 
inventories and the price of fuel and raw materials.200  It would also affect not just 
those countries to which cargos are destined but all other sea born trade, a conse-
quence that, in the current economic climate, must surely be avoided.201  It cannot 
escape notice that the supply of consumer goods – the majority of which are carried 
via this vital sea line – could also be seriously affected.202 
One wonders where the voice of the shipping industry disappeared to when the 
Vietnamese refugees were raped and murdered by Thai fishermen many years 
ago.203  According to P.W. Birnie, “from 1980-85 the UNHCR received reports that 
overall 13,076 had been killed, 2,283 women raped and 592 kidnapped by Thai 
fishermen.”204  According to piracy statistics based on refugee reports in 1981, for 
example, 571 rapes occurred; in 1982, 176; in 1983, 95; in 1984, 68; in 1985, 67; 
in 1986, 58; in 1987, 67; etc.205  In contrast, the European Union Anti Piracy Oper-
ation off the coast of Somalia (named Operation Atalanta) was started on Septem-
ber 12, 2008.206  The Operation was established in support of the UN Security 
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Council Resolutions 1814, 1816, 1838 and 1846 (2008).207  Its tasks are to (a) pro-
tect vessels of the World Food Programme delivering food aid to displaced persons 
in Somalia; (b) the protection of vulnerable vessels cruising off the Somali coast; 
and (c) the deterrence prevention and repression of acts of piracy and armed rob-
bery off the Somali coast.208  The Operation was originally intended to last for 
twelve months,209 but appears to have been extended indefinitely.210   
In addition, China and Iran also sent destroyers and supply ships in order to 
join the anti piracy patrols off Somalia.211  Japan and South Korea were also send-
ing warships to join the missions.212 
More surprisingly, the United Nations Security Council authorized nations to 
conduct land attacks on pirate bases in Somalia.213  Then U.S. Secretary of State, 
Condoleezza Rice, hailed the adoption saying it sent a “strong signal to combat the 
scourge of piracy and the need to end the impunity of Somali pirates.”214  Rice also 
said that the Resolution will have a significant impact since “pirates are adapting to 
the naval presence by traveling further into the sea not guarded by warships sent by 
the United States and other countries.”215  Resolution 1851 authorized the States to 
“take all necessary measures that are appropriate in Somalia” to suppress “acts of 
piracy and armed robbery at sea.”216  Who would bear the cost?  The French con-
tainer carrier CMA CGM will impose a $23.00 per TEU217 surcharge for all con-
tainers on board ships that are transported through the pirate infested Gulf of Aden 
which started January 1, 2009.218  In addition, the ACC accepted the demand to 
double pay the crews on board ships that transit through the Gulf of Aden.219  Natu-
rally, as the global recession picks up steam, there should be more pirates and il-
legal activities taking place off of the coast of Somalia and other strategic commer-
cial areas such as the Malacca Strait.220  According to a newspaper article from 
February 3, 2009, the nation’s maritime academies are offering more training to 
merchant seamen on how to fend off attacks from pirates armed not with cutlasses 
and flintlocks but automatic weapons and grenade launchers.221  Seamen are taught 
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to fishtail the vessels at high speed and to drive off intruders with high pressure 
hoses as well as illuminating the flood lights on their own decks.222 
D. The Potential for Environmental Violence 
The pirates have demonstrated adaptability to changing circumstances and 
flexibility in adapting new methods as necessary to achieve their financial objec-
tives.  Experts have predicted that ships carrying oil, gas and other environmentally 
treacherous chemicals are now targeted by terrorists who could sail these ships into 
a major port and intentionally explode them, echoing the destruction of September 
11, 2001.223  Given their primarily financial motive, pirates will undoubtedly soon 
seize these ships, holding the environment hostage, for the purpose of seeking a 
handsome reward in exchange for release of these caustic chemicals.  A piratical 
attack on a ship carrying caustic chemicals could inadvertently cause a chemical 
spill wreaking havoc on the surrounding ecosystem.  The likelihood of such a cata-
strophic occurrence is a bona fide disaster waiting to happen.  However, the odds 
are increased if piratical acts involving the environment move from inadvertence to 
intentional.  Rather than utilizing conventional techniques such as the kidnapping 
and ransoming of ship captains and crew members, why not kidnap the root of the 
world’s food chain – the environment?  This refined form of piracy is a calamity in 
the making, given that many targets could be chemical carriers or ships loaded with 
nuclear supplies.224 
How much of a ransom would be conveyed, and who would pay the ransom, 
when more than one State could be affected?  If the coastal State is not the only 
one affected, the other States should have the power to act with a degree of urgency 
even if outside its jurisdictional bounds. Environmental concerns related to piracy 
have raised the level of unease among nations, who unfortunately lack a uniform 
international mechanism to attack such a problem.225  As stated, supra, coastal 
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States bear the burden of preventing damages to their environments.  However, 
damage to the environment is not always restricted to the waters of the coastal 
States, and the impact is usually a global one.  Oceanic life tainted with chemicals 
in one part of the world could easily find its way to a dinner plate thousands of 
miles away.226    
For this reason, it is time to implement the concept articulated in the Harvard 
Draft of 1932, of allowing “hot pursuit” of pirate ships from high seas into terri-
torial waters in certain instances.227  As the comment to section 7 of the Harvard 
Draft discusses, hot pursuit will “prevent the escape of culprits who seek to elude 
pursuers by entering territorial waters and who could not  be captured lawfully by a 
foreign pursuer were it not for the license of” the doctrine of hot pursuit.228  In the 
instance of imminent environmental damage, the hot pursuit doctrine is of the ut-
most import.  Hot pursuit could prevent an ecological disaster prior to its occur-
rence.  As seen with the Exxon Valdez Oil spill, the clean up and recovery of an 
environmental injury to oceanic life is not always completely possible.  Although 
waters have been cleaned, they will never again reclaim their pristine condition.229  
An environmental disaster as a result of piracy must be prevented at all costs.  So-
vereignty should not trump environmental sustainability. 
IV. ON THE HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES OF ENFORCING PIRACY LAWS – 
WERE THERE “NORMS” REGARDING THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL SEA 
PIRACY?230 
The only “norm” that was demonstrated by the Harvard Draft was the fact that 
a “diversity of opinion” existed in 1932231 that was “especially remarkable with 
respect to the following fundamental matters”: 
(1) The definition of piracy in the sense of the law of nations. 
(2)The meaning and justification of the traditional assertions that 
piracy is an offence or a crime against the law of nations. 
 ________________________  
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(3) The common jurisdiction of all states to prosecute and punish 
pirates.232  
The Harvard Draft explained that there was the “modern orthodox” view as 
well as other views on the “nature and scope of the law of nations.”233  The ortho-
dox view provided that: 
The law of nations is a law between states only, and limits the re-
spective jurisdictions.  Private individuals are not legal persons 
under the law of nations.  The rights, duties, privileges, and powers 
which it defines are only those of states.  There is no legal univer-
sal society of private persons regulated by international law.234  
Under the orthodox view, then: 
Pirates are not criminals by the law of nations, since there is no in-
ternational agency to capture them and no international tribunal to 
punish them and no provision in the laws of many states for pu-
nishing foreigners whose piratical offence was committed outside 
the state’s ordinary jurisdiction; [therefore,] it cannot be truly said 
that piracy is a crime or an offence by the law of nations, in a sense 
which a strict technical interpretation would give those terms.235 
To the contrary, those with “unorthodox” views would conclude that: 
the law of nations is like municipal law except that it has no inter-
national governmental agencies to enforce it.  These jurists con-
ceive of the civilized states of the world as members of a veritable 
legal community, all subject to the authority of a definite legal or-
der.  Some speak of a citizenship of private individuals in this 
world community, and of international law as the law of a super-
society.  Some maintain that there are international law crimes, al-
though because the international community is backward in organ-
ization, there are no agencies except those of individual states to 
punish offenders.  Some of these jurists argue that there should be 
an international tribunal of justice before which private individuals 
might prosecute their claims against states and private individuals 
might be prosecuted for crimes against the international communi-
ty.  They would classify piracy as such a crime.  Indeed one jurist 
whose fundamental views on international law are otherwise or-
thodox, M. Pella of Romania, considers piracy a prototype to 
which should be assimilated in time all crimes universally recog-
 ________________________  
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nized as offenses against society.  The perpetrators of such crimes, 
he says, should be punished by any state which seizes them, pend-
ing the establishment of an international court of criminal jus-
tice.236 
The upshot of all this is that by 1932: 
[p]iracy lost its great importance in the law of nations before the 
modern principles of finely discriminated state jurisdictions and… 
freedom of the seas became thoroughly established.  Indeed, the 
former prevalence of piracy may be assigned as a principal cause 
of the old reluctance of states to accept the doctrine of the freedom 
of the seas.  Formerly naval powers bought pirates with little re-
gard for the sort of problems which would trouble our modern 
world of intense commerce and strongly asserted national claims 
of numerous states, and with an acquiescence of the commercial 
interests which needed protection against those dangerous com-
mon enemies…237 
V. ON ADDRESSING THREATS OF PIRACY IN THE SOMALI/GULF OF ADEN 
REGION 
The United Nations General Assembly each year publishes the Report of the 
Secretary-General on Oceans and the law of the sea.  It usually comes out in March 
or April and there are appendices later added to the Report(s).238  Last year, 2008, it 
was pointed out in this report that according to UNCLOS, all States have an obliga-
tion to cooperate to the fullest possible extent in the repression of piracy (Article 
100) and have universal jurisdiction on the high seas to seize pirate ships and air-
craft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of pirates, and ar-
rest the pirates and seize the property on board (Article 105).239  Those provisions 
also apply in the exclusive economic zone (Article 58) (2)).240 
Concerning acts of piracy/armed robbery against ships committed in the inter-
nal waters or territorial sea of a littoral State, the primary responsibility falls on the 
coastal State.241  Why?  Because piracy/armed robbery against ships also consti-
tutes an offense under the 1988 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 
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Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (“SUA Convention”) and in some cases 
the 2000 United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime.242 
By Resolution 1816 adopted on June 2, 2008, the Security Council authorized 
nations to attack pirates in territorial and internal waters of Somalia.243  The Transi-
tional Federal Government (TFG) gave its permission for many reasons including 
the deplorable recent incidents of attacks upon, and the hijacking of, vessels in the 
territorial waters and on the high seas off the coast of Somalia.244  There had been 
attacks upon, and the hijacking of, vessels operated by the World Food Programme 
and numerous commercial vessels.245  These attacks created a serious adverse im-
pact on the prompt, safe and effective delivery of food aid and all humanitarian 
assistance to the people of Somalia including the grave dangers they represented to 
vessels, crews, passengers and cargo.246  The Secretary-General noted that the 
IMO, on July 5, 2007, and again on  September 18, 2007, sent letters to the Secre-
tary General regarding the piracy problems that the IMO Assembly Resolution 
A.1002 (25), which strongly urged governments to increase their efforts to sup-
press and prevent piracy, also was in effect.247  It also noted that the Transitional 
Federal Government of Somalia needed and requested international assistance to 
address the problem on the high seas, but also in the territorial waters as well.248  
The Resolution gives various States the right to enter into territorial waters of So-
malia in a manner consistent with such action permitted on the high seas249; this 
authorization applies only to the situation in Somalia and not to other member 
States under international law and it shall not be considered as establishing custo-
mary international law.250  The idea is to protect international shipping, the food 
program and the international law regarding human rights law, as well.251  In addi-
tion, Resolution no. 1851, adopted by the Security Council on December 16, 2008, 
concerned the lack of capacity, domestic legislation and clarity about how to dis-
pose of pirates after they are captured.252  This lack in turn, has hindered more ro-
bust international action against the pirates off the coast of Somalia and, in some 
cases led to pirates being released without facing justice253 (e.g., Denmark dropping 
pirates off on a beach).254  Resolution 1851 reiterated that the 1988 SUA Conven-
tion created criminal offenses, established jurisdiction and accepted delivery of 
persons responsible for, or suspected of, seizing or exercising control over a ship 
by force or threat and included any other form of intimidation.255  It also called on 
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nations to enter into special agreements or arrangements with other nations willing 
to take custody of pirates.256  This was resolved so that enforcement officials (“shi-
priders”) from the affected countries, in particular, countries in the region, could 
facilitate the investigation and prosecution of persons detained as a result of opera-
tions, conducted under this Resolution, for acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea 
off the coast of Somalia.257  The resolution does require the advance consent of the 
TFG prior to any action in Somali territorial waters.258  States are to establish an 
international cooperation mechanism so as to have a common point of contact be-
tween and among States, regional and international organizations.259  States are 
also encouraged to consider creating a center in the region to coordinate informa-
tion relevant to piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, to in-
crease regional capacity with the systems of UNODC, to arrange effective shiprider 
agreements or arrangements consistent with UNCLOS  and to implement the SUA 
Convention, the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized 
Crime and other relevant instruments to which States in the region are party in or-
der to effectively investigate and prosecute piracy and armed robbery at sea of-
fenses.260  All of these matters should be conducted with regard to applicable inter-
national humanitarian and human rights laws.261  A further Security Council Reso-
lution stated, inter alia, that the arms embargo on Somalia does not apply to wea-
pons, military equipment, technical training and assistance intended solely for sup-
port or abuse by the African Union Mission in Somalia and also supplies and tech-
nical assistance by the States intended solely for the purpose of helping develop 
security institutions, etc.262 
The reader will observe the evolution of piracy from earlier centuries, where 
there was an act of one private ship attacking another on the high seas, has evolved 
into a major industry.  We have gone from a state of having the Harvard Draft sug-
gesting that enforcement should be permitted in territorial waters and internal wa-
ters (which was not adopted at any of the two prior Conventions) to a state of per-
mitting, by virtue of Security Council resolutions, navies to interdict and attack 
pirates in territorial waters, internal waters, and on land, all under the guise of pro-
tecting shipping, oil supplies, humanitarian supplies to the Somalis and hopefully 
to protect the environment from oil tankers being ruptured and destroying fragile 
ecosystems.  The Security Council reminded all of us that none of these Resolu-
tions shall become customary international law, that the necessity of protecting 
shipping and crews trumped the sovereignty of a nation when commercial passage 
was undergoing severe trauma.  The pirates argued that their fishing grounds have 
been decimated by foreign fishing vessels and that they had to resort to these acts 
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 262. S.C. Res. 1853, p. 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1853 (Dec. 19, 2008). 
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of violence in order to make a living.263  At least one other author has suggested 
that these piratical acts are acts of terrorism as well as piracy.264  Our understanding 
of terrorism is basically that it is an act done for “political” as opposed to “private” 
ends.  Certainly if terrorist groups were to attack merchant ships at “choke points” 
and elsewhere, they would definitely be considered terrorists.  But we think a fair 
reading of the source material on the subject seems to indicate that these pirates are 
well organized and have the criminal intent to rob.  They are not conducting their 
acts of piracy for political ends.  In fact, if anything, terrorists would want to lure 
the merchant ships closer to their coast so that they could attack and cause huge 
explosions and blow up vessels, which is more in line with terrorism.  Pirates are 
interested in ransom money and nothing else.  However, there is nothing to prevent 
pirates joining forces with terrorists and vice versa. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Security Council Resolutions that have been mentioned couched the intru-
sion into territorial, internal waters and land, by expressing concern for human 
rights so that food shipments would not be blockaded and hijacked by Somali pi-
rates.  Are human rights and the environment more important than the sovereign 
rights of a State?  In our particular situation, this was not a call that had to be made 
because the temporary government of Somalia granted permission for foreign na-
vies to intercede against the pirates.  The more interesting question is what if there 
were no Security Council Resolutions?  Could not one argue that piracy is a crime 
against mankind?  The Harvard Draft stated, in part, because there was no interna-
tional criminal court (in 1932) to prosecute a crime of piracy, it should not be con-
sidered a crime against mankind for treaty (or “expediency”) purposes.  However, 
according to the information supplied by the Harvard Draft, piracy was always 
considered a crime against mankind and States could punish pirates even if the 
States had not enacted municipal legislation against the crime of piracy.  As one 
author pointed out: 
The Vienna Declaration and the regional declarations reiterated 
that human rights – civil and political, as well as economic, social 
and cultural – should be implemented simultaneously, and that nei-
ther set of rights (primarily from Asia,) had to do with “private” 
rights. 
All states are willing to accept the universality of a certain core group of rights.  
These are the rights that are listed in the human rights treaties as “non-derogable” 
rights or are considered jus cogens. 
 ________________________  
 263. Pirates Tell Their Side, supra note 18, at A6.  See also Johann Hari, You are being lied to about pi-
rates, 50 SYNTHESIS/REGENERATION 47, Sept. 22, 2009. 
 264. Douglas R. Burgess, Jr. Piracy is Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2008, at A33. 
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The major distinguishing feature of such rules [of jus cogens] is 
their relative indelibility.  They are rules of customary law which 
cannot be set aside by treaty or acquiescence but only by the for-
mation of a subsequent customary rule of contrary effect.  The 
least controversial examples of the class are the prohibition of the 
use of force, the law of genocide, the principle of racial non-
discrimination, crimes against humanity, and the rules prohibiting 
trade in slaves and piracy . . . 
Other rules probably have this special status include the principle 
of permanent sovereignty over natural resources and the principle 
of self-determination.265 
An International Law of the Sea Tribunal and compulsory dispute provisions 
were created under UNCLOS.  The Tribunal and compulsory dispute provisions 
exist to deal with rights arising under UNCLOS.  An international criminal court is 
in place; and, treaty and customary international laws regarding the rights of hu-
man beings, vis-à-vis the rights of States to proceed on individuals’ behalf, still 
exist.  The doctrine of universality should give every nation the right to try pirates 
under either treaty or customary law. 
International law is an evolving concept.  There is no question that the United 
States, Denmark, and most of the other nations involved believed that it was neces-
sary to obtain a Security Council Resolution(s) in order to pursue pirates into the 
territorial, internal waters and on the territory of Somalia.  This was done for politi-
cal as well as economic reasons. 
Piracy is being conducted more and more by organized gangs in internal waters 
and territorial seas.  It is necessary for States to prescribe and enforce municipal 
statutes in their internal waters and territorial seas in order to block these acts and 
to react, in kind, to them.  Regional cooperation is currently occurring in certain 
areas (e.g., Malacca Strait).  Under the UNCLOS, it is the duty of the coastal States 
to prevent damages to their environments as well as to loss of life and property due 
to the crime of piracy.  By preventing these acts in their territory, they are prevent-
ing severe damage to other States and to the world community as a whole.  They 
have a duty to do as much as they can and should not be allowed to hide behind the 
shield of sovereignty. 
As was stated prior by one of your authors, international waters and territorial 
seas should have another layer of jurisdiction in order to fight specific crimes of 
terrorism and/or piracy:  namely, reaction zones.266.  This would entail the exten-
sion of the hot pursuit doctrine for those crimes originating in reaction zones as 
 ________________________  
 265. Christina M. Cerna, Universality of Human Rights and Cultural Diversity: Implementation of Human 
Rights in Different Socio-Cultural Contexts, 16 Hum. Rts. Q. 740, 745 (1994) (quoting Ian Brownlie, Principles of 
Public International Law 513 (1993)) (emphasis added). 
 266. Leticia Diaz and Barry Hart Dubner, On the Problem of Utilizing Unilateral Action to Prevent Acts of 
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well as for those occurring exclusively on the high seas.267  Are these proposals 
subject to abuse by the intervening State?  Yes, however, there may be no other 
alternative open in a given situation.  Do not think in terms of sovereignty where 
human rights are being violated and the environment despoiled; it is important to 
have these rights considered on the same plane as property rights for purposes of 
obtaining prescriptive and enforcement legislation against pirates.  One should not 
need a UN Resolution to act against pirates. 
 
 ________________________  
 267. Id. 
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